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It’s still bullshit: Reply to Dalton (2016)
Gordon Pennycook∗ James Allan Cheyne† Nathaniel Barr‡ Derek J. Koehler†
Jonathan A. Fugelsang†
Abstract
In reply to Dalton (2016), we argue that bullshit is defined in terms of how it is produced, not how it is interpreted. We agree
that it can be interpreted as profound by some readers (and assumed as much in the original paper). Nonetheless, we present
additional evidence against the possibility that more reflective thinkers are more inclined to interpret bullshit statements as
profound.
Keywords: bullshit, intention, meaning.
1 Reply
Bullshit has been defined as something that is constructed
without concern for the truth (Frankfurt, 2005). By this def-
inition, bullshit statements can be true, false, or meaning-
less. The absence or presence of these factors is irrelevant
to something being bullshit. Nonetheless, although bullshit
statements can be incidentally true, bullshit is generally false
and hence, often problematic.
In our initial investigation of bullshit, we focused on
statements that consisted of randomly selected buzzwords
(Pennycook et al., 2015). We used 20 different statements
across 4 different studies (excluding items from Deepak
Chopra’s Twitter feed, which we will not discuss further
in this reply). Examples include “wholeness quiets infi-
nite phenomena” (wisdomofchopra.com) and “we are in the
midst of a high-frequency blossoming of interconnectedness
that will give us access to the quantum soup itself” (seb-
pearce.com/bullshit). We labelled these statements “pseudo-
profound bullshit” because: 1) they were constructed absent
any concern for the truth and, generally, for that reason, 2)
they do not consistently have unambiguous meaning, though
they can sometimes interpreted by at least some people to
have profound meaning.
In his commentary, Dalton notes, as do we, that at least
some randomly generated statements can be taken as mean-
ingful by some readers. Dalton takes this claim to have
methodological implications but we will argue below this
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cannot be true without further untenable assumptions. We
take Dalton’s claim to actually be conceptual, if not philo-
sophical. Specifically, Dalton’s conceptual point appears to
be based on a radical reader-response theoretical position in
which the meaning of a text is solely what the reader makes
of it. From such a perspective it is, of course, not possi-
ble to say, a priori, that any text is ultimately and always
meaningless as some reader will always have the last say.
Dalton argues, it is (and will always be) possible for at least
someone, somewhere, to find (or perhaps more aptly “con-
struct”) meaning, or what they take to be meaning, by suf-
ficiently contemplating any statement. We, of course, agree
as the very premise of our study was that people would re-
port sentences designed without regard to meaning to be at
least somewhat profound. Bullshit, following the definition
offered by Frankfurt, however, depends on the intentions (or
lack thereof) of the person uttering or writing the relevant
statements. Bullshit that is viewed as profound is still bull-
shit.
As a consequence, without endorsing a radical reader-
response theory, we note that Dalton’s primary point is con-
sistent with the goal of our study. Namely, we hypothesized
that people would indeed report randomly generated state-
ments as not only meaningful but profound and, moreover,
that people would vary in this propensity. This expectation
was based on the assumption that people will find, or sup-
pose that they have found, meaning in such statements. The
very goal of the study was to investigate this tendency em-
pirically, not to argue, as Dalton states, that: “if one cannot
immediately discern meaning in something it is automati-
cally bullshit.” It is important to recognize that even if we
take a radical reader-response position, the only constraint
on our original study was in the use of “pseudo-profound”
as a label for the random sentences. Because they were con-
structed without any concern for the truth, they are bullshit
(by the Frankfurt definition we followed in our original pa-
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Table 1: The 5 most and least profound bullshit statements in Pennycook et al.’s (2015) Study 2.
New scale Source Item Mean (SD)
More
profound
bullshit
sebpearce.com/bullshit As you self-actualize, you will enter into infinite empathy that
transcends understanding.
2.87 (1.17)
wisdomofchopra.com Perceptual reality transcends subtle truth. 2.87 (1.16)
sebpearce.com/bullshit Consciousness is the growth of coherence, and of us. 2.82 (1.16)
wisdomofchopra.com Hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract beauty. 2.60 (1.03)
sebpearce.com/bullshit The infinite is calling to us via superpositions of possibilities. 2.57 (1.22)
Less
profound
bullshit
wisdomofchopra.com Your consciousness gives rise to a jumble of neural networks. 2.31 (1.20)
sebpearce.com/bullshit Today, science tells us that the essence of nature is joy. 2.20 (1.12)
sebpearce.com/bullshit Throughout history, humans have been interacting with the dreamscape
via bio-electricity.
2.18 (1.15)
wisdomofchopra.com The future explains irrational facts. 2.17 (1.11)
wisdomofchopra.com Good health imparts reality to subtle creativity. 2.16 (1.05)
per). Dalton appears to assume that our use of the term bull-
shit implies some sort of value judgment, as it often is in
everyday use. In contrast, and following Frankfurt’s lead,
we used bullshit as a technical term. This is the way that we
hope it continues to be used in the academic literature.
With regard to Dalton’s claim that his argument is
methodological, we note that this cannot be so unless one
assumes that a sample of random computer-generated state-
ments have an equal probability of being interpreted as
meaningfully profound as human-generated statements in-
tended to be meaningful (if not profound). Methodologi-
cally, the key word in the forgoing sentence is sample. In
our study we found and reported that a sample of human-
generated profound quotations (e.g., “A wet person does not
fear the rain”) were rated as more profound than samples
of computer-generated random sentences (see Studies 3 and
4). Thus, the equality of meaning assumption was demon-
strably false for our study.
In reference to the “Wholeness quiets infinite phenom-
ena” example, Dalton takes a phenomenological stance to
meaning: “To engage with a passage like this we need to
contemplate it for more than a few seconds, perhaps a few
minutes (or hours, days, or months) and watch what hap-
pens to our mind – this is the appropriate first person sub-
jective experience and more appropriate outcome of inter-
est.” In the research under discussion, however, such an ap-
proach is not only inappropriate, but altogether irrelevant.
Our interest, in this initial study, was not in the first-person
phenomenology of readers’ subjective experience (though it
might constitute a possible and interesting subsequent line
of research) but simply in participants’ profundity ratings of
statements designed to be lacking in that very quality (i.e.,
as a way to index one’s receptivity to bullshit). Dalton’s ar-
gument does imply the interesting and plausible hypothesis
that people who are more reflective, clever, and/or linguis-
tically adept will be more apt to construct meaning in the
ambiguous statements. Unfortunately for this hypothesis,
increasing reflectivity was negatively associated with report-
ing greater profundity in bullshit statements. One possibility
is that more reflective people were indeed more able to find
meaning where none was intended but are also likely to re-
alize that the meaning was constructed through their own
cognitive efforts rather than by the ostensible author of the
statements.
One potential response to this line of reasoning is that it
may be that only some of the randomly generated statements
are potentially meaningful to some readers or, perhaps more
precisely, that the statements varied in the ease with which
they could be assigned some meaning. Dalton notes, for
example that he cannot derive meaning from the following
statement: “We are in the midst of a high-frequency blos-
soming of interconnectedness that will give us access to the
quantum soup itself”, though we suspect that some people
might. This possibility suggests the further hypothesis that
the association between our variables of interest and profun-
dity ratings for the bullshit items might vary as a function of
the ease of constructing profound meaning from randomly
generated sentences. To test this, we created two new scales
using a subset of the items from Study 2. The “more pro-
found” scale took the mean from the 5 items that were as-
signed the highest average profundity rating and the “less
profound” scale consists of the 5 lowest scoring items (see
Table 1). Both scales had acceptable internal consistency
(Cronbach’s α = .81 and .75 for the relatively more and
less profound items, respectively). As is evident from Table
2, the two scales performed very similarly. Indeed, heuris-
tics and biases performance was significantly more strongly
correlated with the scale that consists of the more profound
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Table 2: Re-analysis of Pennycook et al.’s Study 2. Pear-
son product-moment correlations for 5 most profound and
5 least profound bullshit items. These data are for the full
sample (N = 187). ∗∗∗ p < .001, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗ p < .05.
More
profound
bullshit
Less
profound
bullshit
Heuristics and Biases −.36∗∗∗ −.23∗∗
Need for Cognition −.11 −.16∗
Faith in Intuition .22∗∗ .25∗∗∗
Numeracy −.24∗∗ −.18∗
Verbal Intelligence −.26∗∗∗ −.25∗∗
Advanced Progressive Matrices −.28∗∗∗ −.27∗∗∗
Ontological Confusions .38∗∗∗ .47∗∗∗
Religious Belief .24∗∗ .24∗∗
Paranormal Belief .31∗∗∗ .27∗∗∗
items (r = –.36) than it was with the less profound items (r
= –.23). The correlations were significantly different from
one another according to a William’s test, t(187) = 2.08, p
= .038, though both coefficients are significantly different
from zero (p’s < .01).
This pattern of results is at variance with what we take to
be the implications of Dalton’s argument. Specifically, if the
observation that some participants may find transcendence
in our bullshit items constrains our results, bullshit items
that are more likely to be subjectively meaningful for partic-
ipants should be less strongly negatively correlated (or even
positively correlated) with analytic thinking1. Our results
indicate that, if anything, relatively more profound bullshit
is more strongly negatively correlated with analytic think-
ing; perhaps because it is more difficult to detect that they
are, in fact, bullshit.
2 Conclusion
That it is possible for someone to find meaning in a state-
ment does not prevent it from being bullshit. Indeed, bull-
shit that is not found at least somewhat meaningful would
be rather impotent. Consider the evangelizing of politicians
and so-called spin-doctors, for example. Often, their goal is
to say something without saying anything; to appear compe-
tent and respectful without concerning themselves with the
1To be clear, Dalton does not propose this analysis or any mechanism
that might explain why more profound bullshit would be differentially as-
sociated with analytic thinking. Rather, our point is that this is a necessary
condition for Dalton’s observation that some bullshit items are more (or,
perhaps, genuinely) profound to constrain the results of our original stud-
ies. Put differently, our inclusion of items that are viewed as relatively more
profound does not confound or constrain our findings in any way.
truth. It is not the understanding of the recipient of bull-
shit that makes something bullshit, it is the lack of concern
(and perhaps even understanding) of the truth or meaning
of statements by the one who utters it. Our original study
concluded that people who are receptive to statements ran-
domly generated without concern for meaning (i.e., bullshit)
are less, not more, analytic and logical as well as more intel-
ligent. Dalton’s commentary does not undermine this con-
clusion.
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